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To the great relief of many, American criminal law, long known for
its harshness and expansive prohibitory reach, is now showing signs of
softening.  A prime example of this shift is seen in the proliferation of
laws decriminalizing the personal possession of small amounts of mari-
juana: today, almost twenty states and dozens of localities have em-
braced decriminalization in some shape or form, with more laws very
likely coming to fruition soon.  Despite enjoying broad political support,
the decriminalization movement has, however, failed to curb a core fea-
ture of criminalization: police authority to arrest individuals suspected
of possessing marijuana.  Arrests for marijuana possession have
skyrocketed in number in recent years, including within decriminaliza-
tion jurisdictions.  This Article examines the chief reasons behind this
disconnect, centering on powerful institutional incentives among police
to continue to make arrests, enabled by judicial doctrine that predates
the recent shift toward decriminalization.  The Article also identifies
ways to help ensure that laws decriminalizing simple marijuana posses-
sion, as well as other low-level offenses, better achieve decriminaliza-
tion’s goal of limiting police arrest authority and the many negative
personal consequences flowing from arrests.
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INTRODUCTION
It seems that when it comes to criminal justice, as Bob Dylan once
put it, “the times they are a-changing.”1  After a several-decades-long
experiment in harsh penality, state and federal governments alike are re-
thinking their reliance on lengthy prison terms2 and the collateral conse-
quences flowing from conviction.3  They also are showing greater
willingness to except from the common “one-way ratchet” of criminal-
ization,4 taking steps to shrink their criminal codes and decriminalize
conduct once classified as criminal.5
A notable example of this latter shift is found in legislative efforts to
decriminalize the personal possession of small amounts of marijuana.
While marijuana decriminalization first took root early in the nation’s
war on drugs, in 1973,6 it has garnered increasing interest of late. Today,
1 Bob Dylan, The Times They Are a-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’
(Columbia Records 1964).
2 See NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, ON THE CHOPPING BLOCK, 2013:
STATE PRISON CLOSURES (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
inc_On%20the%20Chopping%20Block%202013.pdf.
3 See Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103,
1104 (2013); The Editorial Bd., In Search of Second Chances, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/opinion/sunday/in-search-of-second-chances.html?_r=0.
4 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of the Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 509 (2001). See also Mary Fan, Legalization Conflicts and Reliance Defenses  92 WASH.
U. L. REV (forthcoming) (“Criminalization is much easier to achieve than decriminalization.”),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2437535.
5 See THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, AN UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS IN MISDEMEANOR
RECLASSIFICATION, PENALTY REDUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING  (2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_def_aba_tsp_reclassification_report.authcheckdam.pdf; American Bar Association,
Recommendation 102C, at 8 (adopted Feb. 8–9, 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/102C.authcheckdam.pdf (“In place
of criminal sanctions, jurisdictions should instead implement a system of civil fines and reme-
dies to address minor offenses that pose no threat to society.”); Darryl K. Brown, Democracy
and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007) (noting efforts including “repealing
or narrowing criminal statutes, reducing offense severity, and converting low-level crimes to
civil infractions”).  While most such efforts occur at the state level, localities have also em-
braced decriminalization. See, e.g., CITY OF PROVO, UTAH CODE § 9.17.010 (2013) (enacting
“Chapter . . . with the intent to decriminalize, where possible, violations of municipal law
which have traditionally been regulated by the criminal, laws.  This is done to assist residents
of Provo City, and others, by expediting the resolution of cases and to remove the social
stigma attached to criminal actions.”).
6 See infra Part I.A.
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public opinion polls show unprecedented support for decriminalization,7
and eighteen states, the District of Columbia and multiple localities have
to some extent decriminalized possession,8 with other jurisdictions seem-
ingly poised to do the same.9
Although the political significance of the shift is not to be dis-
counted, it has become increasingly apparent that public sentiment is at
odds with a countervailing empirical reality: despite ongoing decriminal-
ization, arrests for marijuana possession have skyrocketed in number in
recent years, increasing by several orders of magnitude since 2001.10  In
2012 alone, there were almost 750,000 marijuana-related arrests in the
U.S., more than 87% of which were for simple possession.11  Even more
curious, several states adopting decriminalization boast among the na-
tion’s highest per capita arrest rates for possession,12 and cities in which
decriminalization was adopted—New York and Chicago in particular—
continued to boast very high numbers of possession arrests.13
This Article seeks to explain this legal-empirical disconnect and of-
fer some cautionary observations if, as expected, the nation continues to
embrace marijuana decriminalization and decriminalization more gener-
ally.  Part I examines efforts by state and local governments to
decriminalize possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use
and highlights how the political shift has not resulted in the expected
dramatic decrease in possession arrests.  Part II considers several of the
possible reasons for this, focusing first on the critical role played by ar-
rests for low-level offenses, including marijuana possession,14 in modern
7 See, e.g., Poll: More than Two-Thirds of Delaware Voters Support Removing Crimi-
nal Penalties for Marijuana Possession and Replacing Them with a Civil Fine, MARIJUANA
POLICY PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/media/press-releases/poll-more-than-two-thirds-of.html
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (noting that 68% of Delaware and 63% of Illinois registered voters
favor decriminalization).




10 See infra Part I.B.
11 See Crime in the United States 2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi
.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/persons-arrested/persons-
arrested (last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
12 See infra Part I.B.
13 See infra Part I.B.
14 For discussion of the modern preoccupation with possession offenses, especially in-
volving drugs, see Markus Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (2001).
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policing.15  Arrests, which have major impact on physical liberty16 and
privacy,17 and long-term negative effects on life prospects,18 also have
major instrumental benefits for police officers and their departments,
which they understandably seek to preserve.  At the same time, courts,
asked to address legal challenges to the exercise of police authority, do
so against the backdrop of judicial doctrine that predates recent
decriminalization efforts and enables continued aggressive street-level
enforcement by police.19
Part III seeks to draw some lessons from what to date has been a
less than entirely successful democratic experiment in decriminalization.
One observation lies in the reality that decriminalization, in terms of sub-
stantive law and the procedure conditioning its application, does not al-
ways achieve the diminution in police authority imagined by proponents.
Often this is because the law adopted really amounts to depenalization,
imposing a fine and lessening or denying the possibility of incarceration
or creation of a criminal record, yet leaving intact police power to exe-
cute arrests and carry out searches.  It also can be the case that legislative
efforts to reclassify possession as noncriminal do not actually limit police
authority, as a result of broad judicial understandings of what qualifies as
an arrestable offense.
Against this backdrop, the central institutional role of police as a
source of possible resistance to decriminalization becomes critically ap-
parent.  With decriminalization, as is the case with policing more gener-
15 See, e.g., Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction,
119 AM. J. SOC. 351 (2013); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013).
16 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(describing arrest as “a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is
guilty or innocent”); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (describing arrest as “a
public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty . . . disrupt his employment,
drain his financial resources, curtail his associates, subject him to public obloquy, and create
anxiety in him, his family, and his friends”).  On the negative personal consequences of arrest
more generally, see Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2014).
17 A lawful arrest allows police to search an individual and his “grab area,” see Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), and possibly his car, see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
341–44 (2009).  When brought to a detention facility persons arrested for even a minor offense
can be subject to a strip search, without any individualized suspicion that they possess weap-
ons or contraband. See Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520–23
(2012).
18 Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Conse-
quences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 18, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/as-
arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 (noting nega-
tive impact of arrests in variety of areas including employment, housing, and loans).
19 Reflecting, as Judge Henry Friendly once observed, the “everlasting aye or nay of a
constitutional decision.”  Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 930 (1965).
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ally, the solution will not likely lie in federal constitutional change,20 as
little reason exists to think that the Supreme Court will undo its permis-
sive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence anytime soon.  Rather, if the goals
of decriminalization are to be realized, promise for positive change re-
sides in state courts imposing limits on the search and seizure authority
of police and public pressure being brought to bear on police depart-
ments to ensure that decriminalization is given effect on the nation’s
streets.
I. A CASE STUDY: DECRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA POSSESSION
A. Democracy and Decriminalization
Government efforts to criminalize marijuana originated in 1915
when Utah enacted a law prohibiting the sale or possession of the drug.21
Other states, motivated by a variety of factors, including racial concerns
over marijuana use by Mexican- and African-Americans,22 and the belief
that it served as a gateway to more serious drugs and caused mental ill-
ness and criminal behavior,23 quickly followed suit.  As of 1931, twenty-
two states criminalized marijuana use, possession, or trafficking,24 and
by 1937 the number of prohibitionist states grew to thirty-five.25  By the
1950s, all states had criminal laws restricting marijuana, threatening in-
creasingly harsh punishments.26  Arrests for marijuana offenses kept
pace with this shift, rising exponentially over time: from about 20,000 in
1965 to 190,000 in 1970, and then more than doubling to 421,000 in
1973.27
The federal government first targeted marijuana in 1937, when the
Marijuana Tax Act imposed stringent regulations on prescribing physi-
cians, backed by fines.28  Not until 1970, however, a year after President
20 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762–63,
775–81 (2012).
21 Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of
Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L.
REV. 971, 1010 (1970).  New York City’s Sanitary Laws listed marijuana as a prohibited drug
in 1914. Id.
22 Brent Staples, The Federal Marijuana Ban Is Rooted in Myth and Xenophobia, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/opinion/high-time-federal-mari-
juana-ban-is-rooted-in-myth.html?op-nav.
23 MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA—MEDICAL,
RECREATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 24–26 (2012).
24 Id.
25 Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 21, at 1034.
26 See id. at 1074–77.
27 See James B. Slaughter, Marijuana Prohibition in the United States: History and
Analysis of a Failed Policy, 21 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 420–21 (1988).
28 Marijuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).  Five years before, Con-
gress, alarmed over the prospect of interstate crime caused by an increase in marijuana use,
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Richard Nixon declared a “war on drugs,”29 did Congress formally
criminalize the manufacture, sale and possession of marijuana when it
passed the Controlled Substances Act,30 classifying marijuana as a
Schedule I drug alongside heroin and cocaine.31
Almost as soon as marijuana was criminalized by the federal gov-
ernment, however, decriminalization became the subject of public con-
sideration.  In 1972, President Nixon created the National Commission
on Marihuana and Drug Abuse at the behest of Congress to assess mari-
juana policy.32  Headed by former Pennsylvania Republican Governor
Raymond Shafer, the Commission conducted a dozen public hearings
and reviewed available research, and ultimately unanimously recom-
mended that criminal penalties for the private possession and use of ma-
rijuana be eliminated33 and that states decriminalize public possession
(but not use).34
Shortly after the Shafer Commission’s findings were made public a
New York Times editorial urged a “sharp scaling down of marijuana
penalties” and the “elimination of criminal sanctions.”35  The American
Bar Association, while stopping short of backing total elimination of
criminal penalties, likewise recommended that penalties be significantly
reduced.36  Similar reforms were advocated by other prominent national
organizations, including the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Medical Association.37
Although Congress and President Nixon rejected the Commission’s
findings, with Nixon stating that he did not believe that effective criminal
justice could be based on “a philosophy that something is half legal and
half illegal,”38 interest in decriminalization caught on in the states.  In
1973, Oregon became the first state to decriminalize simple possession,
passed the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, which encouraged states to adopt prohibitions.  Bonnie
& Whitebread, supra note 21, at 1028.
29 DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL: POLITICS
AND FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963-1981, at 60
(2002).
30 Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236–1285 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 812–844 (2013)).
31 18 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2013).
32 NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MIS-
UNDERSTANDING (1972).
33 See Fred P. Graham, National Commission to Propose Legal Private Use of Mari-
juana, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1972, at 1.
34 Id.
35 Editorial, ‘Decriminalizing’ Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1972, at E12.
36 See Fred P. Graham, A.B.A. Would Ease Marijuana Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1972,
at 10.
37 Richard J. Bonnie, The Meaning of “Decriminalization”: A Review of the Law, 10
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 277, 278 (1981).
38 Slaughter, supra note 27, at 423.
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making it a civil violation punishable by a fine.39  By 1975, Colorado,
Alaska, Ohio, and California had decriminalized possession to some ex-
tent,40 and in ensuing years several more states followed suit: Maine and
Minnesota (1976); Mississippi, North Carolina, and New York (1977);
and Nebraska (1978).41
In the late 1970s, however, the decriminalization movement began
to stall.  At the federal level, President Jimmy Carter’s proposal to re-
move criminal penalties for possession of small quantities of marijuana
for personal use was rebuffed by Congress,42 with House members ex-
pressing concern that there would be first decriminalization, then legali-
zation.43  In 1979, more than a dozen state legislatures introduced
decriminalization bills; none passed.44
By the 1980s, although popularity of marijuana among American
youth—across all socio-economic strata—made decriminalization more
politically palatable,45 the drug’s association with remnants of the hippie
counterculture fostered political resistance.46  In the 1980s as well, alarm
grew over cocaine, crack cocaine in particular, prompting a dramatic in-
fusion of resources for drug enforcement, which as cocaine use receded,
resulted in a rededication of attention to enforcing marijuana
prohibition.47
In the last decade or so, however, the decriminalization pendulum
has swung back the other way.  In 2001, Nevada passed its decriminal-
ization statute.48  In 2008, 65% of Massachusetts voters backed the
“Massachusetts Sensible Marijuana Policy Initiative,”49 which changed
simple marijuana possession from a misdemeanor to a “civil offense.”50
In 2011, Connecticut’s decriminalization statute went into effect;51 in
39 Id. at 425.
40 James A. Inciardi, Marijuana Decriminalization Research, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 151
(1981).
41 Id.
42 Carter Asks Congress to Decriminalize Marijuana Possession, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1977, at 15.
43 Id.
44 Eric Josephson, Marijuana Decriminalization: The Processes and Prospects of
Change, 10 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 291, 292 (1981).
45 Inciardi, supra note 40, at 155.
46 Id.
47 Slaughter, supra note 27, at 441–45.
48 John Hughes, Nevada’s Unfortunate Drug Initiative, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct.
12, 2002), http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1016/p11s02-cojh.html.
49 Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Mass. 2011).
50 David Abel, Voters Approve Marijuana Law Change, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 11, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/11/05/voters_approve_marijuana_law_
change/.
51 David Owens, Police Prepare for Marijuana Decriminalization, THE HARTFORD COU-
RANT, July 1, 2011, http://articles.courant.com/2011-07-01/news/hc-police-new-marijuana-
law-0701-20110630_1_marijuana-car-search-police-car.
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2013 Rhode Island52 and Vermont both became decriminalization juris-
dictions;53 and Maryland54 and the District of Columbia (pending con-
gressional approval)55 joined the ranks in 2014.56
Decriminalization has also taken root at the local level.  In Chicago,
for instance, a city in which police made over 33,000 marijuana posses-
sion arrests in 2010,57 the city council in 2012 voted overwhelmingly
(43-3) to have police ticket but not arrest individuals who possess less
than fifteen grams of marijuana, making it a fine-only offense.58  Further
indicative of the shift in political mood, multiple cities and counties in
states retaining criminal prohibition have requested that their police treat
marijuana possession as a “lowest law enforcement priority.”59
The laws have been motivated by a variety of factors.  In addition to
the cost associated with incarcerating individuals convicted of possessing
marijuana,60 and a desire to loosen government control over victimless
52 W. Zachary Malinowski, R.I. Law Now Says It’s Not a Crime to Possess Small
Amounts of Marijuana, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 1, 2013, http://www.providencejournal.com/
breaking-news/content/20130401-r.i.-law-now-says-it-s-not-a-crime-to-possess-small-
amounts-of-marijuana.ece.
53 Nick Wing, Vermont Marijuana Decriminalization Law Goes into Effect, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/01/vermont-marijuana-
decriminalization_n_3529294.html.
54 Mollie Reilly, Maryland Decriminalizes Marijuana Possession, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/14/maryland-marijuana-decriminali
zation_n_5107412.html.
55 Trip Gabriel, Marijuana Is at Center of Feud in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/us/politics/marijuana-decriminalization-in-washington-
dc-is-contested-by-federal-lawmakers.html?_r=0.
56 The laws vary in their threshold maximal amounts, ranging from less than half an
ounce (Connecticut and Maryland) to just under three and one-half ounces (Minnesota). See
States that Have Decriminalized, NORML, http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-
have-decriminalized (last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
57 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BIL-
LIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 15 (2013) [hereinafter ACLU,
WAR ON MARIJUANA], available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/1114413-mj-
report-rfs-rel1.pdf.
58 Kristen Mack, Chicago Oks Pot Tickets, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2012, http://arti-
cles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-28/news/ct-met-council-0628-20120628_1_pot-possession-
possession-of-small-amounts-pot-tickets.  Support at the local government level for
decriminalization, it should not go unacknowledged, is not uniform.  Ohio provides perhaps
the best example: state law classifies possession as a minor misdemeanor, yet local govern-
ments have exercised their home rule authority to classify possession as a first-degree misde-
meanor, a more serious and per se arrestable offense. See City of Niles v. Howard, 466 N.E.2d
539, 541 (Ohio 1984); State v. Williams, No. 2009CA00196, 2010 WL 3766774, at *2 (Ohio
5th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2010).  On the power of local governments to legislate their inde-
pendent criminal norm preferences more generally see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Crimi-
nal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001).
59 See Lowest Law Enforcement Jurisdictions, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, http://www
.mpp.org/reports/lowest-law-enforcement.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (noting thirteen lo-
calities as well as Denver and Seattle, cities located in states in which possession has since
been legalized).
60 See ACLU, WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 57, at 4.
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crimes more generally,61 decriminalization advocates point to major ra-
cial disparities in arrest and conviction rates,62 and the long-term nega-
tive consequences of continued criminalization for individuals (including
collateral consequences such as lost access to student loans and
housing).63
B. Decriminalization on the Streets
The marijuana decriminalization trend represents a major political
shift.  As noted at the outset, however, it also elides a curious counter-
reality: a concurrent massive increase in the number of marijuana posses-
sion arrests.
As a substantial body of research shows, the war on drugs has
largely been a war on marijuana,64 especially possession of small
amounts of the drug.65  In 2010, there were over 889,000 marijuana-re-
lated arrests, 140,000 more than in 2001, and 88% of the arrests were for
possession.66  Of particular significance to the discussion here, heavy po-
lice focus on arrests for possession is evidenced in jurisdictions that have
adopted decriminalization policies.  For instance, Nevada and Oregon
numbered among the top five jurisdictions with the greatest increase in
possession rates between 2001 and 2010.67  And in 2012, New York and
61 See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS! THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING
DRUGS (2002).
62 ACLU, WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 57, at 17–20; Andrew Golub et al., The
Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOL-
OGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 132–55 (2007); Holly Nguyen & Peter Reuter, How Risky Is Mari-
juana Possession? Considering the Role of Age, Race and Gender, 58 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
879, 883–84, 890 (2012); Ian Urbana, Blacks Are Singled Out for Marijuana Arrests, Federal
Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2013, at A15.  This is despite data showing similar mari-
juana usage rates among blacks and whites.  Rajeev Ramchand et al., Racial Differences in
Marijuana-Users’ Risk of Arrest in the United States, 84 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 264,
265–70 (2006).
63 DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, APPROACHES TO DECRIMINALIZING DRUG USE & POSSESSION
1 (2014), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact_Sheet_Ap
proaches_to_Decriminalization_Feb2014.pdf.
64 See Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the
War on Drugs in the 1990s, HARM REDUCTION J., Feb. 9, 2006, at 3, available at http://www
.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6 (noting that in 1992 marijuana arrests made up only
28% of all drug arrests and that by 2002 the percentage grew to 45%).
65 Id. at 2.  From 1990–2002, marijuana arrests accounted for 82% of the increase in
drug arrests nationwide (450,000) and 79% of these arrests were for possession alone.  In
2008, almost 800,000 individuals were arrested for possession, three times the number of such
arrests in 1991.  Nguyen & Reuter, supra note 62, at 880.
66 ACLU, WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 57, at 14.
67 JON B. GETTMAN, MARIJUANA IN THE STATES 2012: ANALYSIS AND DETAILED DATA
ON MARIJUANA USE AND ARRESTS 14–15 (2014), available at http://norml.org/pdf_files/
JBG_Marijuana_in_the_States_2012.pdf.  According to an earlier study, examining
1991–2000 data, more than half of the states decriminalizing possession had higher per capita
arrest rates than criminalization states and experienced significant increases in the number of
possession arrests.  Rosalie L. Pacula et al., Marijuana Decriminalization: What Does It Mean
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Nebraska had the second and fifth highest per capita arrest rates in the
nation for marijuana possession.68
Perhaps the nation’s most widely reported example of local-level
resistance was seen in New York City.  Despite New York State having
decriminalized personal possession of marijuana in 1977, City police
long waged an aggressive campaign to arrest individuals for possession,
most recently generating massive numbers of arrests based on a proviso
in state law allowing arrest when marijuana is “open to public view” (a
class B misdemeanor).69  According to media reports and a lawsuit chal-
lenging the practice, police invoked the exception when, after stopping
individuals and ostensibly having reasonable suspicion that they pos-
sessed a weapon, commanded that they empty their pockets, resulting in
the public view of marijuana.70
Marijuana possession arrests figured centrally in the NYPD’s “qual-
ity of life” and “order maintenance” policing practices,71 accounting for
a 2,461% increase in marijuana possession arrests since the late 1990s.72
Between 1998 and 2013 marijuana possession arrests in New York City
ranged from 30,000–50,000 a year,73 dwarfing the number of such ar-
rests in the state as a whole,74 and reflecting dramatic racial disparities.75
Despite strenuous public criticism, and concern voiced by New York
Governor Cuomo, possession arrests continued unabated.76
in the United States? 22–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9690, 2003),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9690.
68 ACLU, WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 57, at 15.
69 N.Y. PENAL CODE § 221.10 (McKinney 2014).
70 Natapoff, supra note 15, at 1064–65.
71 See Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race, and the New
Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 591, 592 (2010).
72 King & Mauer, supra note 64, at 3; see also Geller & Fagan, supra note 71, at 591
(“Although possession of small quantities of marijuana has been decriminalized in New York
State since the late 1970s, arrests for marijuana possession in New York City have increased
more than tenfold since the mid-1990s, and remain high more than 10 years later.”).  Posses-
sion arrests, while playing a critical role, have been but a part of the massive number of low-
level offenses serving as grist for the mill of the City’s order maintenance policing. See K.
Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened
Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 285, 298 n.80 (2014).
73 Christopher Mattias, NYC Police Making Fewer Marijuana Arrests, But There’s Still a
Huge Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/
18/new-york-city-marijuana-arrests_n_5171657.html.
74 Bruce D. Johnson et al., An Analysis of Alternatives to New York City’s Current Mari-
juana Arrest and Detention Policy, 31 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 226,
243 (2008).
75 Golub et al., supra note 62, at 139.
76 Christopher Mathias, NYPD Still Making Thousands of Marijuana Arrests, and One
Lawmaker Has Had Enough, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2014/05/28/nypd-marijuana-hakeem-jeffries_n_ 5400453.html; 80 Marijuana Possession
Arrests a Day Is More of the Same, MARIJUANA-ARRESTS.COM, http://marijuana-arrests.com/
docs/MORE-OF-THE-SAME—NYC-Marijuana-Arrests-June2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 26,
2014).  Only very recently, as this Article was going to press, did police signal a willingness to
 2014] AFTER THE CHEERING STOPPED 329
Similar street-level resistance is evident in Chicago where, as men-
tioned earlier, the City Council in 2012 directed police to ticket (not ar-
rest) for marijuana possession.77  Notwithstanding that the law was
motivated by a concern to have police dedicate their attention to more
serious misconduct in a city with a high homicide rate,78 police contin-
ued to make possession arrests,79 at a rate even higher than before the
law took effect.80  After the law’s implementation, the city’s per capita
marijuana possession arrest rate was over 2.3 times greater than the na-
tional average,81 with rates in some neighborhoods being more than
1,100% greater.82
Police officials offered a variety of explanations for the outcome.
According to the superintendent of police, officers made arrests when
those detained lacked identification, smoked marijuana in public, or pos-
sessed the drug near a park or school grounds.83  Another more practical
reason was voiced by Chicago Fraternal Order of Police President Mike
Shields, who offered that “[t]he ticketing process is a pain in the butt.
It’s so much easier to do a marijuana arrest the old-fashioned way.”84
Officials were also asked to explain why, despite city council concern
relent on their arrest policy, as a result of heavy pressure from new Mayor Bill de Blasio who
campaigned as a staunch advocate of police reform. See Joseph Goldman, Marijuana May
Mean Ticket, Not Arrest, in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/11/10/nyregion/in-shift-police-dept-to-stop-low-level-marijuana-arrests-officials-
say.html.
77 See Mack, supra note 58.
78 Id.
79 See Mike Dumke, Mayoral Ally Thanks Police for Ignoring the Pot Decriminalization
Law He Sponsored, CHICAGO READER, Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/
archives/2013/11/01/mayoral-ally-thanks-police-for-ignoring-the-pot-decriminalization-law-
he-sponsored; see also Becky Schlikerman, More Arrests than Tickets for Pot in Chicago,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, May 19, 2014, at 10.
80 Fran Spielman & Frank Main, Pot Tickets a Bust, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013,
at 10.
81 KATHLEEN KANE-WILLIS ET AL., ILLINOIS CONSORTIUM ON DRUG POLICY OF
ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY, PATCHWORK POLICY: AN EVALUATION OF ARRESTS AND TICKETS FOR
MARIJUANA MISDEMEANORS IN ILLINOIS 19 (2014) [hereinafter ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY
STUDY].
82 Id.
83 Spielman & Main, supra note 80.
84 Id.  To issue a ticket, police must be qualified to field-test the substance in question or
summon a colleague who is, and a trip must be made to the station to inventory the drug, the
field test kit and the test affidavit. Id.  According to union president Shields, “I can get
through a physical arrest in 45 minutes.  With this new process, it probably takes about an hour
and 15 minutes.” Id.  Shields elaborated: “If you’re a gang banger and a known problem and
you have weed, you’re damn right you’re getting locked up.” Id.  A supervisor in a high-crime
district likewise related that citations are a “pain in the ass.”  Mike Dumke, Chicago
Decriminalized Marijuana Possession—But Not for Everyone, CHICAGO READER, Apr. 7,
2014, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/police-bust-blacks-pot-possession-after-
decriminalization/Content?oid=13004240.  In New York City, the arrest process has been sim-
ilarly streamlined, requiring 30–60 minutes of officer time.  Bruce D. Johnson et al., Policing
and Social Control of Public Marijuana Use and Selling in New York City, 6 LAW ENFORCE-
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over the racially skewed nature of marijuana possession arrests, over
78% of arrestees post-enactment were black and that several predomi-
nantly black areas of the city actually experienced increases in the num-
ber of possession arrests.85  As noted by a local researcher familiar with
the data, “[w]here the rubber hits the road is the practice, and there’s a
really big disconnect between the policy and the practice.”86
The importance of police buy-in is borne out by experience in Illi-
nois more generally where, despite state law continuing to criminalize
possession, over one hundred municipalities have enacted ticket ordi-
nances for marijuana possession.87  In Chicago, 93% of alleged viola-
tions resulted in an arrest, whereas in nearby more affluent Evanston the
rate was 31%.88  In Champaign, where the University of Illinois is lo-
cated, arrests were made in 25% of cases.89  Underscoring the critical
role of implementation, the authors of a recent study examining arrest
practices in Illinois note that “policing practices must change.  It is not
enough to change the wording in the law.  Without clear leadership in the
municipality, practices may remain the same, even though, on the books,
the law was changed.”90
Similar resistance has been evidenced in other localities.  In Flint,
Michigan, for instance, city police and state troopers publicly proclaimed
their intent to make possession arrests despite voters’ strong endorsement
of a ballot decriminalization initiative.91  Philadelphia police responded
in like fashion to the city council’s endorsement of decriminalization.92
Police have also ignored efforts by local voters and political bodies di-
recting them to make enforcement of criminal possession laws a low
priority.93
MENT EXECUTIVE FORUM 58, 67 (2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti
cles/PMC2964872.
85 Dumke, supra note 84.
86 Schlikerman, supra note 79, at 10 (quoting director of Roosevelt University’s Illinois
Consortium on Drug Policy).
87 ROOSEVELT UNIVERSITY STUDY, supra note 81, at 8.
88 See id. at iv–v.
89 Id. at 10.  In Aurora, Illinois officials never implemented an ordinance that was
adopted. Id. at 20.
90 Id.
91 Gary Ridley, Flint Decriminalization of Marijuana Vote Only “Symbolic;” Arrests
Will Continue, City Says, MLIVE.COM (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index
.ssf/2012/11/flint_police_will_still_make_m.html (noting determination by Flint, Michigan
police to enforce state law despite decriminalization ordinance approved by 57% of city
voters).
92 Mike Adams, Philly Police Ignore Decrim, 264 Arrests This Month, HIGH TIMES (July
22, 2014), http://www.hightimes.com/read/philly-police-ignore-decrim-264-arrests-month.
93 See, e.g., Mike Nizza, Denver Officials Ignore Marijuana Votes, THE LEDE N.Y.
TIMES BLOG (Mar. 6, 2008, 9:13AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/06/denver-of
ficials-ignore-marijuana-votes/; Phillip Smith, Feature: Lowest Law Enforcement Priority Ma-
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II. DECRIMINALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
As the preceding Part makes clear, democratic endorsement of
decriminalization does not necessarily translate into fewer marijuana
possession arrests.  This Part examines the institutional forces militating
against the wind down, focusing on resistance from police and the judi-
cial doctrine that informs their work.
A. Police Instrumentalism
It has long been recognized that police officers play a critical
gatekeeping role in the criminal justice system.  While they are expected
to arrest individuals suspected of having committed serious crimes, they
wield near-total discretion to execute arrests for low-level social-disorder
offenses,94 which have a variety of significant benefits for individual of-
ficers and the departments that employ them.
First, arrests serve as a tangible performance metric.  Almost fifty
years ago, Jerome Skolnick noted that arrests allowed police to fulfill
“production demands,”95 in what even then was recognized as “a major
industry in modern urban society.”96  That arrests themselves fail to re-
sult in conviction is not especially important;97 what is important, from
the perspective of individual officers and their supervisors, is the number
of arrests.98
rijuana Initiatives Face the Voters in Five Cities, STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (Oct. 26, 2006),
http://stopthedrugwar.org/print/1605.
94 See Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV.
427 (1960); see also Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 547 (1960).
95 See JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 243 (1966); see also ARTHUR NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE IN
URBAN SOCIETY 53 (1967) (“[I]n the precinct a patrolman is measured by his arrest record.”).
96 SKOLNICK, supra note 95, at 240–41.
97 See Gerald M. Caplan, Book Review, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into
Custody, 80 HARV. L. REV. 484, 487–88 (1966) (noting practice of “nonprosecutive policing”
with respect to low-level victimless crimes, “geared to a record-keeping system and a promo-
tional structure that emphasizes ‘clearance by arrest, not clearance by prosecution or convic-
tion’”); Wayne R. LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of
the Police, 45 TEX. L. REV. 434, 445–48 (1967) (noting that police effectiveness with vic-
timless offenses is not tied to clearance rates but rather is gauged by arrests and that a paucity
of arrests suggests that police are not doing their job).  Before the First World War, mayoral
administrations in Cleveland and Toledo, Ohio experimented with a policy in which police
were instructed that “their efficiency was determined not by the number of arrests they made
but by the number of convictions which resulted from their arrests.”  Robert H. Bremner, The
Civic Revival in Ohio: Police, Penal and Parole Policies in Cleveland and Toledo, 14 AM. J.
ECON. & SOC. 387, 387 (1955).
98 See, e.g., John A. Eterno, Op-Ed, Policing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/opinion/the-nypds-obsession-with-numbers.html.
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Police departments, despite evidence to the contrary,99 have long
resisted accusations that arrest quotas exist, a concern that has grown
over time as departments100—especially in large urban areas101—have
explicitly embraced quantitative management methods.  Marijuana pos-
session arrests afford a compelling illustration.  For officers on street pa-
trol, they are low hanging fruit,102 as they are easy to make compared to
arrests for other crimes,103 and provide new officers with opportunities
for training and experience.104
Marijuana possession arrests also provide tangible economic bene-
fit.  For officers, the arrests, especially when triggering overtime pay,
amount to “collars for dollars.”105  For departments, while possession ar-
99 See, e.g., JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE 50 (1973) (“Arrest quotas are rigidly
enforced for vice arrests . . . .  Regardless of their success in fulfilling other departmental
goals, any failure to produce the necessary vice arrests means trouble for the captain, the
lieutenants, the sergeants, and all the men in the district who have jobs that they want to
keep.”); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF
LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 86–88, 96–98, 174 (1968) (noting arrest quotas in
various municipal police departments).
100 The New York City Police Department’s “CompStat” program, used since 1994 to
track criminal incidents and citizen complaints in individual precincts, serves as the nation’s
foremost example. See generally DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., POLICE FOUND. REPORTS, THE
GROWTH OF COMPSTAT IN AMERICAN POLICING (2004).
101 See JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGE-
MENT BY MANIPULATION 228–29 (2012) (noting use in inter alia Baltimore, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Newark, and San Francisco).  In New York City, CompStat has come under repeated
fire for its purported causal role leading to arrest quotas.  According to former NYPD Captain
John Eterno:
Eighteen years after the start of the much-vaunted CompStat system of data-driven
crime fighting . . . precinct commanders are pitted against one another and officers
are challenged to match or exceed what they did the previous year, month and week.
Words like “productivity” are code for quotas.  Supervisors must exceed last year’s
“productivity” regardless of community conditions, available budget and personnel,
and, most important, the consequences to citizens.
Eterno, supra note 98; see also Nathaniel Bronstein, Police Management and Quotas: Govern-
ance in the CompStat Era, 48 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at
12–13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424912.
102 See David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55, 60 (2008); King & Mauer, supra note 64, at 5, 11.
103 See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2022 (2008) (dis-
cussing how drug arrests are a police focus because they are cheap to investigate and require
fewer personnel hours than more serious crimes).
104 Harry Levine, The Scandal of Racist Marijuana Arrests—and What to Do About It,
THE NATION (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/176915/scandal-racist-marijua
na-arrests-and-what-do-about-it?page=0,2.
105 HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MA-
RIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY 1997–2007,
at 19–20, available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/MARIJUANA-ARREST-CRUSADE_Final
.pdf.  According to the study’s authors, marijuana arrests have become a “‘quality of life’ issue
– for the police.” Id. at 19.  Nor is it unprecedented for officer pay to be directly tied to the
affirmative decision to arrest. See, e.g., Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1452, 53 (5th Cir.
1984) (stating that a “Mississippi fee statute is not [unconstitutional] . . . where the arrest is
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rests consume resources,106 the budgetary effect is counterbalanced by
federal government funding allocations tied to marijuana possession ar-
rest numbers.107  Moreover, marijuana arrests, like arrests for other low-
level offenses, play a central sustaining role in an arrest-dependent sys-
tem facing continued falling serious crime rates.108
Surely not to be overlooked as well, arrests provide police on street
patrol major strategic and tactical benefits, satisfying a range of social
control objectives, including maintaining respect, clearing the street of
individuals who arouse general suspicion, and facilitating the investiga-
tion of other suspects.109  At least as important, arrests afford police a
key investigatory tool of immediate importance: they allow searches.
otherwise validly made without a warrant and on probable cause” and that an arrest is not
rendered unconstitutional “simply on account of the officer’s motives in making the arrest”).
106 See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, ONE MILLION POLICE HOURS: MAKING 440,000 MARI-
JUANA POSSESSION ARRESTS IN NEW YORK CITY, 2002-2012, at 5, 7 (2013), available at http://
www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/One_Million_Police_Hours_0.pdf; see also King &
Mauer, supra note 64, at 6.
107 ACLU, WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 57, at 100–04; see also Radley Balko, Anat-
omy of a Pot Bust, WASH. POST, June 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2014/06/05/anatomy-of-a-pot-bust/ (recounting testimony from a trial in San Fran-
cisco, where the Board of Supervisors directed police to make marijuana possession arrests a
low enforcement priority, in which officers acknowledged that they received overtime pay for
their work and that the department received federal money for buy-bust operations).  For an
earlier recognition of funding influence, see NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE, supra note 32, at 129–30 (1972) (“The funding mechanism is so structured that it
responds only when ‘bodies’ can be produced or counted.  Such a structure penalizes a reduc-
tion in the body count, while it rewards any increase in incidence and arrest statistics with
more money.  Those receiving funds thus have a vested interest in increasing and maintaining
those figures.”).
108 King & Mauer, supra note 64, at 11; see also Joseph Goldstein, Safer Era Tests Wis-
dom of “Broken Windows” Focus on Minor Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2014, http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/nyregion/safer-era-tests-wisdom-of-broken-windows-focus-on-mi
nor-crime-in-new-york-city.html?_r=0 (discussing significant drop in felony arrests and sharp
increase in minor offense arrests as a result of N.Y.P.D. policing strategies and noting that “as
the city grew safer, the police also pursued even lower violations, such as having a foot on a
subway seat”); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, End the War on Marijuana, NYPD, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/war-marijuana-nypd-article-1.1215819
(“New York City’s marijuana exceptionalism has little to do with contributing to public
safety . . . .  [T]here is mounting evidence that patrol officers feel pressure to issue summons
and make misdemeanor arrests just to hit targets, irrespective of public safety goals.”).  Before
CompStat, the NYPD averaged 2,300 marijuana possession arrests per year; since then the
annual average has been 36,000. HARRY G. LEVINE & LOREN SIEGEL, DRUG POLICY ALLI-
ANCE, $75 MILLION A YEAR: THE COST OF NEW YORK CITY’S MARIJUANA POSSESSION AR-
RESTS 4 (2011), available at http://marijuana-arrests.com/docs/75-Million-A-Year.pdf.
109 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
144–52 (1965). See also PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTI-
MORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 119–20, 155 (2008) (noting police use of arrest “to assert authority
or get criminals off the street”); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 10 (1993) (noting that criminal law is “fre-
quently used for purposes unrelated to the punishment of criminals”); Wesley G. Skogan &
Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 71 (2004)
(noting studies finding that “officers intent on seizing contraband, disrupting illicit networks,
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When an individual is lawfully arrested (as opposed to being issued a
ticket or summons110) police can search the arrestee’s body and the area
within his physical reach.111  If the arrestee is in or was a recent occupant
of an automobile at the time of arrest, police can possibly search the
passenger compartment and containers located therein,112 impound the
vehicle, and inventory its contents.113  In all such instances, any evidence
or contraband found can serve as a basis for prosecution of other, possi-
bly more serious (and career-enhancing) criminal misconduct.114  Fi-
nally, arrests allow police to collect valuable identifying data, including
biometric information such as fingerprints, mug shots, and DNA, which
can be retained for later investigative use.115
In short, arrests for minor offenses play a staple role in modern-day
policing.  Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assertion that police are
predisposed “to limit petty-offense arrests, which carry costs that are
simply too great to incur without good reason,”116 police have powerful
individual and institutional reasons to make arrests.117  The verity of this
or asserting their authority on the street freely violated [legal rules] because their goal was not
principally to secure an individual conviction”).
110 See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118–19 (1998).
111 See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 440 (2001).
112 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341–44 (2009).
113 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372–73 (1987).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The potential
benefits to be derived from a search of the person . . . provide the police with the incentive to
employ the [search incident] exception as a potent investigatory tool.”).  Indeed, police can
execute arrests for minor offenses that they would not otherwise perhaps even bother with
solely as a pretext, acting on a hunch or suspicion that the arrestee is engaged in more serious
misconduct. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001).
115 See Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1603 (2012).  While to
date DNA collection efforts have been mainly limited to felony arrests, it should not come as a
surprise that collection increasingly occurs based on arrests for less serious offenses. See id. at
1562, 1587.
116 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 523 (2001).
117 See supra notes 94–115 and accompanying text.  Further testament of the executive’s
more general interest in the preserving arrest authority, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giu-
liani, when zero tolerance and order maintenance policing were gaining steam in the mid-
1990s, prevailed upon the state legislature to recriminalize dozens of minor offenses that had
been treated as civil offenses.  Clifford Krauss, State Legislators Agree to Restore Arrests for
Minor Offenses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at 26.
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is underscored by the massive number of arrests for minor offenses that
fail to result in prosecution,118 much less conviction.119
B. Doctrine
Police incentives to arrest, however, do not operate in an institu-
tional vacuum.  Rather, they interact with permissive judicial doctrine,
which predates the current surge in interest in decriminalization.
1. Arrest Authority
When it comes to the warrantless arrest authority of police, the Su-
preme Court’s landmark 2001 decision in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista120 stands out for its singular importance.  In Atwater, the Court was
presented with the question of whether a warrantless arrest of a motorist
for failure to wear a seat belt, an offense resulting a maximum penalty of
a $50 fine and no jail time,121 violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion of unreasonable seizures.  By a 5–4 vote, the Court concluded that
any arrest, even “for a very minor criminal offense,” is constitutionally
reasonable so long as the officer possessed probable cause to believe that
the alleged misconduct occurred.122
Rejecting petitioner’s suggestion that police make case-specific de-
terminations regarding whether the minor offense might trigger jail time
under applicable law, the Court adopted a bright-line “readily adminis-
trable rule[ ].”123  Requiring particularized judgments, the Atwater ma-
jority reasoned, would unduly complicate the job of police, for instance,
118 See, e.g., Golub et al., supra note 62, at 1147 (reporting a non-conviction rate of 80%
in New York City from 1992–2003); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 674 (2014) (noting that in New York City less than half
of misdemeanor arrests in 2012 resulted in a conviction of any kind); Robert Skyora, Our New
Permanent Punishment Machine, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, http://www.crimeandjustice
.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=65 (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (citing statistics from Minnesota’s
two largest counties indicating that in 2004 nearly 60% of misdemeanors resulted in dismissals
or not guilty verdicts).  On the occurrence of minor offense arrests without conviction, more
generally, see Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD.
L. REV. 1 (2000).
119 What Alexandra Natapoff has aptly called “arrests without evidence.”  Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1331–37 (2012).  Conviction data them-
selves, it warrants mention, are of questionable value given that innocent individuals, espe-
cially those swept up in high-volume urban justice systems, might well plead guilty simply to
alleviate the cost (e.g., remaining in jail and missing work or paying for counsel) of challeng-
ing what might be a wrongful arrest. See Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the
Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 318 (2005).
120 Atwater, 532 U.S. 318.
121 Id. at 354 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(d) (West 2001)).
122 Id.  The sole constitutional reasonableness requirement is that the act of physical arrest
not be carried out in an “extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to the [arrestee’s] privacy or
physical interests.” Id. at 352–53.
123 Id. at 347.
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obliging them to decide whether “the weight of the marijuana [is] a gram
above or a gram below the fine-only line.”124  Indeed, obliging police to
draw such distinctions would create a “systemic disincentive to arrest”:
An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough
to warrant jail time . . . would not arrest, even though it
could perfectly well turn out that, in fact, the offense
called for incarceration . . . .  Multiplied many times
over, the costs to society of such under enforcement
could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being
needlessly arrested and booked.125
In making probable cause the both necessary and sufficient precon-
dition of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the Court, as Justice
O’Connor remarked in dissent, afforded police “constitutional carte
blanche” to arrest.126  Despite the majority’s assertion of a “dearth of
horribles demanding redress” as a result of “widespread abuse” of war-
rantless arrest authority for minor offenses,127 the case law even then
contained a multitude of examples.128  Not surprisingly, the Atwater
Court’s clear-cut endorsement of police authority to arrest for minor of-
fenses has done nothing to lessen the incidence of such arrests.129
For civil libertarians, a close reading of Atwater held out hope for a
modest limit on police warrantless arrest authority: that police could ar-
rest for nothing less than a “very minor criminal offense.”130  It is not
certain, however, that the Court is wedded to a requirement that police
124 Id. at 348–49.
125 Id. at 351.
126 Id. at 365–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 322–23 (majority opinion).
128 See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte
Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 430–31 (2002) (surveying multiple instances of arrest, including for
illegal parking, littering, riding a bicycle without a headlight, possessing drug paraphernalia,
eating food on a subway, speeding, and driving with a broken taillight).
129 See, e.g., Reid v. Henry County, Ga., 568 F. App’x 745, 748 (11th Cir. 2014) (lack of
working car turn signal); Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 661 (7th Cir. 2011) (driving
without use of auto headlights); Brown v. Fisher, 251 F. App’x 527, 534 (10th Cir. 2007)
(inoperable car headlight); Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003) (jaywalk-
ing); Rodi v. Rambosk, No. 2:13–cv–556–FtM–29CM, 2014 WL 1876218, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
2014) (failure to stop at a stop sign); People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 63 (Cal. 2002) (riding a
bicycle in the wrong direction down a residential street); Perkins v. United States, 936 A.2d
303, 304, 309 (D.C. 2007) (violating open container law); State v. Mercante, 836 So. 2d 596,
598 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (urinating in public); McBride v. State, 359 S.W.3d 683, 686, 692
(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (jaywalking).  In the District of Columbia, police can arrest for 159
minor offenses, including operating a radar detector, storing building materials in an alley,
climbing a street lamp, and digging for fishing bait in Rock Creek Park.  Mike DeBonis, Here
Are 159 Minor Things D.C. Officers Can Arrest You For, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2011, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/mike-debonis/post/here-are-159-minor-things-dc-officers-
can-arrest-you-for/2011/10/24/gIQA4mDRDM_blog.html.
130 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added).
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warrantless arrest authority is limited to offenses classified as criminal.
Indeed, in Arkansas v. Sullivan,131 a per curiam decision issued roughly a
month after Atwater, the Court in perfunctory fashion stated than an ar-
rest for travelling 40 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone, a “violation” resulting in
only a fine under Arkansas law,132 was permissible.133  Even more re-
cently, the Court in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the
County of Burlington134 upheld the strip search of an individual arrested
(mistakenly, it turned out) for civil contempt for failure to pay a fine, a
non-criminal offense under New Jersey law.135
Atwater’s broad authorization to arrest was significantly bolstered a
few years later by Virginia v. Moore,136 which held that state statutory
limits on police arrest authority (in Moore, requiring that persons sus-
pected of driving with a suspended license be ticketed and not arrested
absent extenuating circumstances) were immaterial when it comes to as-
sessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness.137  In Atwater, the chal-
lenged arrest for failure to wear a seat belt was legally permitted under
state law: the Texas Legislature authorized (but did not require) police to
arrest violators.138  In Moore, on the other hand, the arrest was in direct
and knowing contravention of state law prohibiting arrest under the cir-
cumstances, yet a unanimous Court, invoking Atwater’s “probable cause
standard”139 condoned the arrest (and thus also the search conducted in-
cident thereto).140
Atwater and Moore have synergistically combined to afford police
unprecedented discretionary authority to arrest for minor offenses.  As
131 Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 770 (2001) (per curiam).
132 See Respondent’s Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S.
769 (2001) (No. 00-262), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1045, *32–34 (citing ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-1-108, 27-51-201(a)(1), 27-50-301).
133 See Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771 (“[W]e note that the Arkansas Supreme Court never
questioned [the arresting officer’s] authority to arrest Sullivan for a fine-only traffic violation
(speeding), and rightly so.” (citing Atwater, 532 U.S. 318)).
134 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012).
135 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-
945), 2011 WL 220710, at *4.  For further discussion of Florence and its implications, see
Wayne A. Logan, Symposium, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: Police Power Takes
a More Intrusive Turn, 46 AKRON L. REV. 413 (2013).
136 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
137 Id. at 167 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (Lexis 2004)).  In Atwater, the majority
emphasized that, short of a constitutional prohibition, police authority to arrest for minor of-
fenses might be limited by statutes specifying extenuating circumstances in which arrests
might be permitted.  Such an approach would be preferable to a broad constitutional rule, the
Court reasoned, because “the statute can let the arrest power turn on any sort of practical
consideration without having to subsume it under a broader principle.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at
352.
138 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323.
139 Moore, 553 U.S. at 171.
140 Id. at 177–78.
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Judge Posner recently noted in a decision upholding an arrest for civil
contempt (for alleged failure to pay parking tickets), “arrests for viola-
tions of purely civil laws are common enough.”141  Citing Atwater and
Moore, Judge Posner added that “the fact that [an arrest] is not for an
‘arrestable’ offense does not make it unconstitutional.”142  Justice
Thomas, also writing in 2009, echoed this expansive view, recognizing
as a “basic principle of the Fourth Amendment” that officers “can en-
force with the same vigor all rules and regulations regardless of the[ir]
perceived importance,” and regardless “of the perceived triviality of the
underlying law.”143
The foregoing has obvious importance for decriminalization.
While, as discussed later, state decriminalization laws vary in their con-
tent, a common characteristic is that they reclassify marijuana as a civil
offense.  Whether the lexical shift has practical significance, in terms of
limiting police authority post-Atwater, is thus a question of critical im-
portance.  As noted earlier,144 state courts have embraced Atwater, and
federal courts are showing little inclination to attach importance to state
legislative classificatory changes, as evidenced by a recent case out of
Oregon.  In upholding a warrantless arrest for jaywalking, which Oregon
recently sought to decriminalize as a non-arrestable, non-criminal “traffic
violation” punishable only by a fine,145 the federal trial court in Miller v.
City of Portland stated:
The principle behind Moore is that state law does not
define the protections against unreasonable search and
seizure afforded by the Fourth Amendment.  This princi-
ple holds true whether the offense for which state law
prohibits arrest is a misdemeanor or “violation.”  That
Oregon has denominated this particular offense a “viola-
tion” rather than a “crime” is immaterial to the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, and thus this denomination can-
not affect the propriety of any arrest thereunder.146
The court elaborated that a state’s political decision to restrict police au-
thority, to “redefin[e] . . . certain violations of its laws as mere ‘viola-
tions,’ and not ‘crimes,’ cannot be held to affect the parameters of the
141 Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Moore, 553
U.S. at 174).
142 Id. at 637.
143 Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 391 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in result and dissenting in part).
144 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
145 Miller v. City of Portland, No. 3:11-01509-JE 2014, 2014 WL 320555, at *5 (D. Or.
Jan. 29, 2014).
146 Id. at *8.
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Fourth Amendment’s protections.”147  Were this not the case a “state
would render otherwise constitutional actions unconstitutional simply by
changing the terminology with which it refers to violations of law.”148
Just as Virginia’s decision to impose procedural preconditions for arrest
in Moore did not affect the constitutionality of a probable cause-based
arrest, the court reasoned, Oregon’s choice of a “‘more restrictive’ pol-
icy” on the punishment classification of jaywalking had no impact on the
constitutionality of police prerogative to arrest.149
Along these same lines, the Eighth Circuit, relying on Atwater and
Moore, recently upheld the arrest of a Nebraska resident suspected of
possessing an ounce or less of marijuana,150 an “infraction” under state
law to be enforced by a citation and punishable by a fine.151
2. Auto Search Authority
Long-standing doctrine affording police authority to search automo-
biles is another way in which decriminalization efforts can be under-
mined.  Since the Prohibition-era case of Carroll v. United States,152
police have been able to search an auto when probable cause exists to
believe that it contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband.153
Based on this case law, courts have allowed auto searches because, even
if marijuana is not technically subject to criminal prohibition, its posses-
sion is still unlawful and therefore qualifies as “contraband.”154  Relying
on Carroll and its progeny, jurisdictions that otherwise deny police the
right to arrest or search an individual, absent probable cause to believe
147 Id. at *9.
148 Id.
149 Id. (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174 (2008)).
150 United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 749–50 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 2446 (2011); cf. United States v. Burtton, 599 F.3d 823, 830 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding
arrest for violation of Nebraska’s “open container” law, an infraction, stating that “[i]n light of
Moore, if an arrest is otherwise reasonable, the fact that it is not for an arrestable offense, does
not make it unconstitutional”).
151 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-416(13)(a) (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN § 29-435
(West 2014).
152 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
153 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Pugh, 223 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (D. Me. 2002) (quoting
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331–32 (2001)) (“The case law requires only that there
exist a fair probability that evidence of a crime or contraband will be found.  Contraband
includes ‘unlawful drugs’”); People v. Waxler, 224 Cal. App. 4th 712, 721 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014) (“[A] law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle pursuant to
the automobile exception when the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
marijuana, which is contraband.”); State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844, 848 (Or. 2010) (deeming
marijuana contraband “regardless of its quantity”). Cf. State v. Barclay, 398 A.2d 794, 797
(Me. 1979) (“[M]arijuana, even when its possession can only give rise to a civil violation, can
be a legitimate object of a search warrant, and if found, can be seized and confiscated.”)
(internal citations omitted).
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the individual possesses a criminal amount of marijuana, such as Minne-
sota,155 permit auto searches under such circumstances.156
The presence of any marijuana, moreover, can justify a search for
the possible presence of a larger, criminalized amount.  As the California
Court of Appeal put it in upholding the warrantless search of a car in
which an officer saw and smelled burnt marijuana, “[i]t is well settled
that even if a defendant makes only personal use of marijuana found in
the passenger compartment of a car, a police officer may reasonably sus-
pect additional quantities of marijuana might be found in the car.”157
Nor is police authority to search limited by the fact that an individual
might possess a marijuana medical use license, allowing lawful posses-
sion of the drug or possession of a greater amount.158
III. REALIZING DECRIMINALIZATION
Change, as any self-help guru will tell you, is never easy.159  With
decriminalization, the obstacles to reducing arrests and searches are insti-
tutional—from rank-and-file police officers and their departments, and
courts that provide the doctrinal basis for resisting limits on police search
and seizure authority.  This Part considers possible ways in which demo-
cratically driven change, embodied in decriminalization efforts, can per-
haps be more fully realized.
155 See State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 n.2 (Minn. 2009).
156 See State v. Dickenson, No. A13-1516, 2014 WL 2807676, at *5–6 (Minn. Ct. App.
2014); State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014); see also State v. Moore,
734 N.E.2d 804, 808 (Ohio 2000) (upholding auto search based on experienced officer’s
smelling of burnt marijuana).
157 Waxler, 224 Cal. App.4th at 723–24.  For discussion of the probable cause effect of
burned and unburned marijuana, vis-a`-vis the warrantless search of a closed container, see
Robey v. Superior Court, 302 P.3d 574, 597–98 (Cal. 2013) (Liu, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 725; see also United States v. Phillips, No. 2:13-CR-00398-MCE, 2014 WL
1275916, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014) (“[P]olice [need not] determine whether an individ-
ual has a medical marijuana card before making an arrest, or conducting a search, for posses-
sion of marijuana.”); People v. Stormoen, No. B253681, 2014 WL 3686093, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 24, 2014) (stating that medical marijuana laws “do not alter the probable cause
analysis; they provide a limited immunity, not a shield from reasonable investigation”).  In
Washington State, before voters approved legalization of personal possession of up to an
ounce of marijuana, state law allowed only the medicinal use of marijuana and expressly pro-
hibited arrest “solely for being in the presence or vicinity of medical marijuana or its use.” See
Sinclair v. City of Grandview, 973 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1259 (E.D. Wash. 2013) (citing WASH.
REV. STAT. § 69.51A.050(2) (2008)); see also State v. Fry, 228 P.3d 1, 8 (Wash. 2010).  A
federal court, however, denied a wrongful arrest claim, relying on Moore to conclude that
probable cause existed to support officers’ belief that the petitioner (along with a medical
marijuana card holder) violated Washington law by manufacturing or possessing marijuana
without a license. Sinclair, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 1259. Cf. People v. Brown, 825 N.W.2d 91, 94
(Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a medical use license is an affirmative defense to criminal
prosecution).
159 Yet, it is also the case, as perhaps the same guru will offer, cribbing from Heraclitus,
that “in life, change is certain—unless you need it for the bus.”
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A. Substantive Law and Its Construction
With decriminalization, one thing that becomes immediately evident
is that it comes in many guises.  As one commentator observed twenty-
five years ago:
[T]here is no consensus on the meaning of “decriminal-
ization.”  In a strict sense the term should be used to ap-
ply to behavior which is not sanctioned by criminal law.
However, with respect to marijuana, the term
“decriminalization” has generally been used to describe
laws which reduce the legal sanctions for possession of
small amounts to penalties other than imprisonment. . . .
[T]he possession of marijuana remains against the law
and is subject to penalties, although the maximum pen-
alty is only a fine.160
As a consequence, “[e]ven though possession is no longer subject to in-
carceration in the ‘decriminalization’ states, it remains against the law to
possess the drug. . . .  [T]he broad police powers of search and seizure
still apply and must necessarily be broadly used as long as possession
remains an offence.”161
The foregoing assessment remains true today.  While the nation’s
chief advocacy organization, the National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws (NORML) considers eighteen jurisdictions (seventeen
states and the District of Columbia) as having embraced decriminaliza-
tion,162 closer consideration reveals significant variation.  The laws fall
into two broad categories: those that (1) much like earlier laws, described
above, retain the criminal status of possession yet impose less in the way
of punishment, usually prescribing a fine and either no or lessened jail
time, and (2) laws that reclassify possession as a civil wrong.
The first approach really amounts to depenalization, qualifying as
decriminalization in name only.  Possession is still criminalized, it is
only punished to a lesser extent, meaning (as in Atwater) that police can
still arrest.163 Nevada, for instance, classifies possession as a misde-
160 Eric Single, The Impact of Marijuana Decriminalization: An Update, 10 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL’Y 456, 456 (1989).  Even then it was evident that “‘decriminalization’ laws in the
U.S. were much less radical than their name implies.  They merely involved the elimination of
jail terms for first offenders, which had already been an unusual sentence for most cases.” Id.
at 462.
161 Id. at 462.
162 See States That Have Decriminalized, supra note 56.
163 See Rosalie L. Pacula et al., What Does It Mean to Decriminalize Marijuana? A
Cross-National Empirical Examination 4 (JSP/Center for the Study of Law & Soc. Faculty
Working Papers, Sept. 2004), available at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9v76p00j.
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meanor,164 a crime that is arrestable under state law.165  North Carolina
has made possession a class 3 misdemeanor, warranting a suspended sen-
tence,166 but state law authorizes arrest for all misdemeanors.167  In
Alaska, possession is a class B misdemeanor,168 also a basis for custodial
arrest.
With the second category of decriminalization, possession is reclas-
sified as a civil “infraction,” “violation,” or “offense.”  The change in
nomenclature, however, can be deceptive, often only giving the nominal
appearance of limiting police search and seizure authority.  In California,
for instance, possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is an “infrac-
tion punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars”169 and no
jail time.170  An infraction, however, is still technically deemed a
“crime” or “public offense” under the California Penal Code,171 and laws
governing arrest for misdemeanors apply to infractions.172  California
courts have held that a custodial arrest for a fine-only offense is permissi-
ble,173 and have allowed arrests for marijuana possession in particular.174
New York provides a similar example.  There, in addition to police alleg-
edly manipulating situations in order to justify marijuana in “public
164 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.336(4)(a) (West 2014).
165 Id.  § 193.120(3).
166 N.C. GEN STAT.  § 90-95(d)(4) (West 2014).
167 Id. § 15A-401(b); see also United States v. Massenberg, No. 4:11-CR-4-FL, 2011 WL
3652741, at *6 n.4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2011) (noting that simple possession remains an arrest-
able offense under state law).
168 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.71.060 (West 2014).
169 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West 2014).
170 CAL. PENAL  CODE § 19.6 (West 2014).
171 Id. § 16 (West 2014); see also People v. Waxler, 224 Cal. App. 4th 712, 723 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014) (noting that simple possession of marijuana remains a “crime” under California
law).
172 See CAL. PENAL  CODE § 19.7 (West 2014) (“[A]ll provisions of law relating to misde-
meanors shall apply to infractions including, but not limited to, powers of peace of-
ficers . . . .”); see also id. § 840 (authorizing arrest for infraction).
173 See People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 63 (Cal. 2002) (holding that a custodial arrest for
the infraction of riding a bicycle the wrong way down a street does not “violate the Fourth
Amendment and that compliance with state arrest procedures is not a component of the federal
constitutional inquiry”).
174 See, e.g., People v. Bester, No. A137728, 2014 WL 710961, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb.
25, 2014); People v. Delery, No. B24024, 2013 WL 5209821, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 17,
2013); People v. Keding, No. A136147, 2013 WL 6814453 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2013).
According to data compiled by the State Attorney General, California’s decision to reclassify
possession from a misdemeanor to an infraction, effective January 2011, has had a demonstra-
ble impact on lowering the number of marijuana-related arrests. See KAMALA HARRIS, ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2012, app. at 63 (2012), available at
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/publications/candd/cd12/cd12.pdf (noting “sig-
nificant decline in misdemeanor marijuana arrests”).  However, because data are not collected
on the number of arrests for infractions, it remains unclear the extent to which arrests for
possession continue to be made.
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view” scenarios (an arrestable misdemeanor),175 state law provides that
simple possession is a “violation” for which a desk appearance ticket is
to be issued,176 yet seemingly allows for arrests (and hence searches).177
Vermont, likewise, makes possession a “civil violation,” punishable only
by a fine, yet expressly provides that the provision “is not intended to
affect the search and seizure laws afforded to duly authorized law en-
forcement officers under the laws of this State.”178
At the same time, state procedural limits on police arrest authority,
even if not given constitutional short shrift in the wake of Virginia v.
Moore,179 can have less street-level effect than perhaps envisioned.  Con-
sistent with the Atwater majority’s concern over the difficulty in mari-
juana possession cases of requiring police to draw fact-based legal
175 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2014).
176 See id. § 10.00(3) (classifying a “violation” as “an offense” that can result in up to
fifteen days imprisonment); id. § 221.05 (“Unlawful possession of marijuana is a violation
punishable only by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.”).
177 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.75 (McKinney 2014) (stating with respect to pos-
session that “[w]henever the defendant is arrested without a warrant, an appearance ticket shall
promptly be issued and served upon him”); Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 150.75 (McKinney 2014) (“As indicated by the language of the present section, a
person may be arrested for unlawful possession of marijuana; that is, the officer need not serve
an appearance ticket in lieu of making the arrest.”); William C. Donnino, Practice Commen-
tary, N.Y. Penal Law § 221.00 (McKinney 2014) (stating that “[a]lso unique to this offense is
that the Criminal Procedure Law provides that upon arrest for this violation, generally the
defendant must be given an appearance ticket”).  The impact of the confusion is noted in the
Practice Commentary:
The distinction between service of a ticket in lieu of arrest and service after arrest is
important should a question arise regarding the officer’s right to search the person
and further incriminating evidence is found as a result of a search incident to arrest.
The law is not really clear on the issue of whether a custodial type arrest is permit-
ted, which would authorize a search of the defendant’s person, since the officer is
required to promptly issue an appearance ticket.
Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 150.75 (McKinney 2014); see
also Cabral v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 4659(LGS), 2014 WL 4636433, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2014) (interpreting New York law to allow custodial arrest for simple marijuana
possession).
178 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4230a(a)(c) (West 2014).  Although not concerning posses-
sion, a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals case is instructive of the modest impact offense
reclassification can have.  In Collins v. University of New Hampshire, the defendant chal-
lenged his arrest for disorderly conduct, a “violation” under New Hampshire law.  664 F.3d 8,
14 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:2(VI)).  The court rejected the argu-
ment that “one cannot be arrested for an offense classified as a ‘violation,’” noting that “the
use of the word ‘crime’ [in New Hampshire law] was not intended as a word of limitation but
rather to encompass broadly all offenses prohibited by statute or ordinance.” Id. (quoting State
v. Miller, 348 A.2d 345, 347 (N.H. 1975).  The First Circuit elaborated that the disorderly
conduct statute was part of the state’s criminal code and that there was no basis to conclude
that “an offense defined in the Criminal Code is somehow civil in nature.” Id.
179 See 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
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distinctions in the field,180 courts interpreting the parameters of
decriminalization have afforded police considerable latitude, for instance
allowing arrests unless it is clear that the suspect did not possess an ar-
restable amount.181  It also remains to be seen how weight is to be deter-
mined with marijuana-laced “edibles”: for instance, a person found with
a “pot brownie” that weighs over the specified amount allowed.182
Courts, however, can play a critically important role in ensuring that
decriminalization is effectuated on the streets.  A foremost example is
found in Massachusetts, whose highest court, in the wake of a voter-
approved constitutional decriminalization initiative later codified in stat-
utory law, made clear that it will not “undermine the clear intent of the
voters to alter police conduct” vis-a`-vis marijuana possession.183  In a
series of recent cases the court has barred police from executing auto
searches184 and arrests185 absent probable cause that a suspect is engaged
in criminal behavior, for instance possessing over an ounce of marijuana
or distributing the drug.  The decisions have had a significant impact.  In
2008, possession arrests in Massachusetts numbered 8,502; in 2010, a
year after decriminalization took effect, the number of arrests dropped to
180 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348 (2001) (stating that officers
executing arrests cannot be expected to know whether “the weight of the marijuana [is] a gram
above or gram below the fine-only line”).
181 See, e.g., State v. Hanson, 488 N.W.2d 511, 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
182 Cf. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461(1991) (including “blotter” paper
when calculating the weight of LSD); State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn. 2009) (in-
cluding weight of “bong water” when calculating weight of methamphetamine).
183 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 985 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Mass. 2013); see also Common-
wealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 910 (Mass. 2011) (noting that the law signaled the desire of
voters to “change the societal impact of possessing one ounce or less of marijuana” and send a
“clear directive to police departments handling violators to treat commission of this offense as
noncriminal”); id. (“The entire statutory scheme implicates police conduct in the field.  Ferret-
ing out decriminalized conduct with the same fervor associated with the pursuit of serious
criminal conduct is neither desired by the public nor in accord with the plain language of the
statute.”).
184 See Commonwealth v. Overmyer, 11 N.E.3d 1054, 1060 (Mass. 2014) (holding that
the odor of unburnt marijuana, without probable cause to believe that car contained a criminal
amount of marijuana, did not justify search); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 985 N.E.2d 843, 849
(Mass. 2013) (“Absent articulable facts supporting a belief that either occupant of the vehicle
possessed a criminal amount of marijuana the search was not justified by the need to search for
contraband.”); Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 985 N.E.2d 839, 843 (Mass. 2013) (because officer
lacked probable cause to believe vehicle occupants sharing marijuana joint were engaged in
distribution officer lacked probable cause to search trunk); Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 911–13 (hold-
ing that while marijuana is contraband, because it remains unlawful to possess any amount of
marijuana, police must have “probable cause to believe that a criminal amount of contraband
is present in the car” in order to invoke auto exception).
185 See Jackson, 985 N.E. at 859–60 (holding that because a lawful arrest requires the
existence of probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a criminal offense, and
because the sharing of a marijuana cigarette was akin to simple possession, a non-criminal
offense, arrest was unlawful). Cf. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d at 908 (holding that officer lacked author-
ity to order individual out of car because he only had evidence of a civil violation being
committed, not probable cause to believe individual possessed over an ounce of marijuana).
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1,181.186  The Commonwealth now has the lowest per capita arrest rate
for marijuana possession in the nation,187 and from 2001 to 2010 saw the
nation’s largest percentage decrease in possession arrests: 86%.188
State courts, moreover, by invoking their own constitutions, what
Justice Brennan famously called a potential “font of individual liber-
ties,”189 have it within their power to limit police arrest authority.  The
Ohio Supreme Court, for instance, has declined to follow Atwater and
has held that arrests for minor misdemeanors violate both state law and
the Ohio Constitution,190 and state intermediate courts of appeal have
rejected Moore and invalidated arrests when police violate state law re-
quiring that police ticket (and not arrest) individuals suspected of pos-
sessing marijuana.191  Other decriminalization states have similar cite-
and-release provisions,192 providing state courts an opportunity to give
street-level effect to decriminalization.
Whether this comes to pass, however, depends in significant part on
the involvement of federal courts.  This is because federal courts enjoy
authority to override state constitutional (and statutory) preferences in
cases filed in federal court193 when state-investigated cases “go federal”
as a result of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction.194  In Ohio, for in-
stance, federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, have adhered to
Atwater and Moore and allowed arrests for minor misdemeanors.195  Fur-
186 ACLU, WAR ON MARIJUANA, supra note 57, at 114.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 42 n.32.
189 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
190 See State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 177–78 (Ohio 2003) (holding that an arrest for
the minor misdemeanor of jaywalking was unconstitutional under the Ohio Constitution).  For
the handful of other state cases that have rejected Atwater on state constitutional grounds see,
e.g., State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004); State v. Bauer, 36 P.3d 892, 897
(Mont. 2001); State v. Bayard, 71 P.3d 498, 501–02 (Nev. 2003); State v. Rodarte, 125 P.3d
647, 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
191 See, e.g., State v. Robinson, No. 10CA0022, 2012 WL 1970447, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 4, 2012); State v. Hall, No. 95983, 2011 WL 4600406, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 6,
2011); State v. Melvin, No. 88611, 2007 WL 2135121, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 26, 2007).
For a pre-Atwater case advancing the same position see State v. Robinson, 659 N.E.2d 1292,
1297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
192 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2283(1) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 453.336 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4230(a) (West 2014).
193 See generally Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The Enduring Challenge of
Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REV. 293, 296–97 (2013) (discussing
“reverse silver platter” doctrine).
194 See Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243,
1247–48 (2010) (discussing concurrent authority and the common occurrence of federal drug
prosecutions arising out of arrests made by state and local police).
195 See, e.g., Synek v. Brumfield Township, No. 5:11-CV-774, 2012 WL 4483806, at *8
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2012) (denying wrongful arrest claim because plaintiff had no federal
constitutional right to avoid arrest for the commission of a minor misdemeanor); Hall v. Vil-
lage of Gratis, No. 3:07-CV-351, 2008 WL 4758693, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2008) (same
 346 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24:319
ther illustrative of the divide, a federal trial court in Tennessee recently
upheld an arrest (and subsequent rectal search) by Tennessee police of an
individual suspected of simple marijuana possession, in disregard of state
law that only allowed issuance of a citation under the circumstances.196
Opportunity for such overrides, it should be noted, could be less-
ened as a result of what appears to be decreasing U.S. Department of
Justice interest in state-originated marijuana possession cases.197  Yet
even if this comes to pass,198 state and local-generated drug possession
cases can still be expected to figure in federal criminal cases based on the
very common occurrence of such arrests serving as a basis to uncover
illegal weapons, a mainstay of federal criminal dockets.199
B. The Police and Public Opinion
Substantive law and the judicial doctrine that informs it, however,
only partially account for how (and whether) decriminalization is given
effect on the streets.  As Part I made clear, and policing scholars have
long noted more generally,200 police buy-in plays a critical part.
Historically, rank-and-file police and their departments have not al-
ways been known for their embrace of progressive ideals,201 and police
and noting that the “Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless arrests for minor
misdemeanors”).
196 Booker v. LaPaglia, No. 3:11–CV–126–PLR–CCS, 2014 WL 4259474 (E.D. Tenn.
Aug. 28, 2014) (interpreting TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-418(b), 40-7-118(b)(1)).
197 See Commonwealth v. Craan, 13 N.E.3d 569, 578 (Mass. 2014) (noting Department of
Justice Memoranda issued in 2009 and 2013).
198 To date, the policy has not met with universal approval in local federal prosecutor
offices. See Harry Bruinius, Brooklyn DA and New York Police at Odds on Minor Crimes,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 9, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014/0709/
Marijuana-Brooklyn-DA-and-New-York-police-at-odds-on-minor-crimes-video (“[F]ederal
law enforcement officials and local [U.S.] attorneys have bristled at the policy [discouraging
federal possession cases in decriminalization states], and many federal arrests have continued
in pot-friendly states.”).
199 Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE
L.J. 2236, 2251–52 (2014); see also, e.g., United States v. Johnsonmarin, No. CR11-00063
WHA, 2011 WL 2899095, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (upholding marijuana posses-
sion arrest resulting in federal firearm prosecution, and noting that even if arrest was unlawful
under state law, Fourth Amendment analysis was not affected because the San Francisco po-
lice officers were “cross-designated as federal officers”).
200 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 109, at 525 n.74 (“[It] is important to determine pre-
cisely to what degree the law is communicated to the police and, to the extent that it is, the
degree to which the legal norms are accepted by the police.”).
201 For example, a decade after the Supreme Court invalidated consensual homosexual
sodomy laws on constitutional grounds in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), police
in Louisiana persisted in arresting individuals based on a “carnal copulation” law still on the
books.  Jim Mustian, Gays in Baton Rouge Arrested under Invalid Sodomy Law, BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, July 28, 2013, at A1. See also SKOLNICK, supra note 95, at 59–62 (stating
that “policemen are notably conservative, emotionally and politically” and discussing several
examples in support); id. at 117–18 (commenting on “tenacity” of police with respect to drug
policy and the policing of narcotics offenses).  The views of law enforcement on their role as
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can have strong motivation to maintain the status quo.202  In this respect,
they are like other policy “implementation agents,”203 rational choice ac-
tors prone to resisting changes that do not align with their individual and
institutional interests.204
When evaluating the likely implementation success of decriminal-
ization, it is thus important to remain mindful of the irreducibly political
nature of policing.205  Modifying police behavior, as Professor David
Sklansky has observed, does not turn solely on “issues of [police] cul-
ture”; attention must also be paid to “questions of institutional structure:
both the internal decision-making structures of police departments and
the external processes of political control.”206  “[D]emocracy,” Sklansky
correctly notes, “tends to enter discussions of policing today in ways that
are hesitant, weak and confused.”207
A key lesson of the story recounted here is that when it comes to
regulating police behavior, democratically endorsed preferences and po-
lice practice can be at odds with one another.  The Supreme Court has
posited that an outraged public will serve as an effective check on police
overreach,208 especially when it occurs at the local level.209  The late
William Stuntz championed a similar view.210  Faith in police respon-
foot soldiers in the drug war, it should not go unacknowledged, are not monolithic, as the
organization Law Enforcement Against Prohibition attests. See LAW ENFORCEMENT AGAINST
PROHIBITION, http://www.leap.cc/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
202 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  The unique institutional interests and
perspective of police is seen in conflicts that can arise with prosecutors, who when urging
officers to bring them “better” arrests have faced sharp criticism from police, their fellow
executive branch actors. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 125, 196 (2008).
203 See James P. Spillane et al., Policy Implementation and Cognition: Reframing and
Refocusing Implementation Research, 72 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 387, 390 (2002).
204 See SKOLNICK, supra note 95, at 243 (“[T]he police seek the opportunity to introduce
the means necessary to carry out ‘production demands.’  The means used to achieve these
ends, however, may frequently conflict with the conduct required of them as legal actors.”).
205 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 143
(1956) (noting that “policing in our culture is a public, political function”); id. at 145 (“[A
police officer] is the living embodiment of democratic law.  If he conforms to that law, he
becomes the most important official in the entire hierarchy, able to facilitate the progressively
greater realization of democratic values.”).  For a more extended development of this same
point from the same era see GEORGE E. BERKLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC POLICEMAN (1969).
206 DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 99 (2008).
207 Id. at 58.
208 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006); Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419, 426 (2004).
209 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1949) (positing that public opinion can be “far
more effectively exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of the police directly responsi-
ble to the community itself” than against “remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the
country”).
210 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 588 (1992) (“Fourth Amendment regulation is usually
unnecessary where large numbers of affected parties are involved.  Citizens can protect them-
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siveness and democratic accountability, however, has long been ques-
tioned by others who maintain that push-back is muted when those
targeted lack political influence.211  Experience in Chicago, where mari-
juana possession arrests of poor and minority residents have persisted in
the face of decriminalization,212 whereas they have not in comparatively
more affluent and white Evanston and Champaign, Illinois,213 affords
strong evidence of the political counter-narrative being at work.
In light of the foregoing, how can decriminalization and the forces
resisting it be reconciled?  One option might be to increase the direct
political accountability of police.  Unlike their fellow executive branch
actors, prosecutors,214 heads of urban police departments do not typically
stand for election,215 based on historic concern over cronyism and target-
ing of political opponents.216  Yet the instances of political process fail-
ure recounted here suggest why greater direct political accountability
might have appeal.  If democratic preference continues to shift toward
decriminalization, and faces resistance, heightened political accountabil-
ity might not be such a bad thing after all.217  Noted former police chief
and scholar O.W. Wilson was surely right when he long ago remarked
that “the police cannot progress ahead of public sentiment.”218  They
should not, however, be permitted to lag behind it.
CONCLUSION
As the decriminalization movement attests, the American body poli-
tic is showing increasing interest in softening the harsh penal policies
adopted over the past several decades.  Whether the shift persists is any-
one’s guess but given strong political support from the political left and
selves in the same way that they protect themselves against most kinds of government miscon-
duct—they can throw the rascals out.”).
211 See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees
for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2068 (2006) (citing and dis-
cussing sources making this point).
212 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
213 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
214 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
581 (2009).
215 Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 CRIME & JUST.
51, 57–58 (1992).
216 See generally ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE (1977); SAMUEL WALKER, A
CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM (1977).
217 Such accountability of course critically depends upon public awareness of police be-
haviors and practices.  On the historic lack of such information and the challenges involved in
securing it more generally see Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96
MARQ. L. REV. 1119 (2013).
218 O.W. WILSON, POLICE PLANNING 48 (2d ed. 1957).
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right alike there is reason to think that it will.219  If it does, and jurisdic-
tions continue efforts to shrink the reach of the “exorbitant codes” that
the Supreme Court has largely refused to regulate,220 advocates should
remain mindful of the obstacles that stand in the way of fulfilling the
goals of codified law on the streets.
Laws that merely lessen the punishment of marijuana possession,
for instance, do not necessarily limit police power to arrest, contrary to
the apparent supposition of the nation’s leading advocacy organiza-
tion.221  Neither do laws that seek to limit the collateral consequences of
arrest or conviction, such as with respect to employment or access to
student loans.222  Similarly under-inclusive are recent calls for prosecu-
tors to refuse to charge possession cases brought to them by police,223 as
doing so again fails to remove possession from law enforcement’s “menu
of options” for arrest,224 and ignores the functional reality that police
supervisors need not defer to prosecutorial policy.225
219 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: Ameri-
can Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597, 609–12
(2011).
220 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (refusing to regulate police
arrest authority in the face of “exorbitant codes,” stating that there is “no principle” that would
enable it to distinguish prohibitory laws that are “so commonly violated that infraction itself
can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement”).  Only on rare
occasion has the Court seen fit to invalidate criminal law prohibitions on constitutional
grounds, with consensual homosexual sodomy being the most recent notable example. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
221 See States That Have Decriminalized, supra note 56 (asserting that decriminalization
results in law enforcement treating possession “like a minor traffic violation”); see also DRUG
POLICY ALLIANCE, APPROACHES TO DECRIMINALIZING DRUG USE & POSSESSION (2014), avail-
able at http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact_Sheet_Approaches_to_Decrim
inalization_Feb2014.pdf (“Decriminalization is the removal of criminal penalties for drug law
violations (usually possession for personal use).”).
222 See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153.008(1)(b)–(c) (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit.18, § 4230(a)(5) (West 2014).
223 See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Proposal to Limit Prosecutions of Marijuana Cases in
Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2014, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/
24/nyregion/in-brooklyn-proposing-to-end-prosecutions-for-low-level-marijuana-offenses
.html; see generally Roger A. Fairfax, Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243
(2011); K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 321–34 (2014); Erik
Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 793 (2012).
224 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (2011);
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 932–33 (2006).
225 See, e.g., Joel Rose, Brooklyn DA Shifts Stance on Pot, But that Won’t Impact NYPD,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 12, 2014) http://www.npr.org/2014/07/12/330761032/brooklyn-da-
shifts-stance-on-pot-but-that-wont-impact-nypd (quoting NYPD Commissioner William Brat-
ton’s response to report that the Brooklyn district attorney plans to no longer prosecute low-
level marijuana possession cases: “It will not have any impact on our officers and the discre-
tion they have as they go about their business”). Cf. Craig R. McCoy et al., Philadelphia
Plans Fines for Use of Marijuana, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 5, 2010, at A1 (discussing Philadel-
phia initiative whereby arrests would no longer be prosecuted as misdemeanors but would
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As the discussion here also makes clear, however, even when nomi-
nal limits on police authority are imposed, they can lack practical effect.
Police officers and their departments have powerful institutional incen-
tive to maintain their search and seizure authority, which has been ena-
bled by judicial doctrine that took shape during the nation’s decades-long
experiment in harsh penality.  To the Supreme Court, probable cause of
misconduct—itself a very low proof threshold226—is the sine qua non of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness,227 and state procedural limits on po-
lice authority to arrest for minor offenses lack federal constitutional rele-
vance.228  The Court has also afforded police extensive authority to
search cars when they have probable cause to believe that contraband is
present,229 which lower courts have taken to include marijuana, because
despite decriminalization its possession technically remains unlawful.230
In the absence of a forceful state judiciary, willing to reify and enforce
state political will and constitutional tradition, limits on police authority
to search and seize risk going unrealized.
Even presuming, however, that decriminalization efforts succeed in
limiting police authority, hazards remain.  Perhaps most significant is the
prospect that governments, by imposing fines in lieu of prison or jail,
will maintain or actually increase enforcement because doing so will
generate revenue,231 without need to extend expensive constitutional
rights, such as the right to legal counsel and a jury trial.232  At the same
time, rank-and-file officers, feeling pressure to “keep their numbers up,”
rather result in a fine and required drug abuse treatment, and quoting police spokesperson as
saying that police would continue to make arrests and “[w]hether or not they make it through
the charging process, that’s up to the D.A.”).
226 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (describing probable cause as a “‘fluid
concept’ turning on the assessment of probabilities”); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742
(1983) (plurality opinion) (stating that probable cause “does not demand any showing that [the
arresting officer’s belief in a suspect’s guilt] is correct or more likely true than false”).
227 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); see also Maryland v. Prin-
gle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (positing that the existence of probable cause serves as an
effective safeguard against executive branch overreach).
228 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
229 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
230 Id.
231 For extended discussion of this impulse, long present but assuming greater importance
as a result of the recent proliferation of “legal financial obligations” imposed on low-level
offenders in particular, see Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice,
2014 ILL. L. REV. 1175.
232 See SPANGENBERG PROJECT, supra note 5, at 3; see also Taylor Whitten, Note, Under
the Guise of Reform: How Marijuana Possession Is Exposing the Flaws in the Criminal Jus-
tice System’s Guarantee of a Right to a Jury Trial, 99 IOWA L. REV. 919 (2014).  For an
instance of a court refusing to allow decriminalization to result in denial of the right to a jury
trial, on state constitutional grounds, see State v. Fuller, 311 P.3d 861, 863–64 (Or. 2013)
(holding that right attaches when defendant arrested for misdemeanor thefts and prosecutor
decided to pursue charge as violations).
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might feel the urge to expand enforcement.233  Even officers who might
have been disinclined to arrest when possession was criminalized, might
feel less constrained when they know that an individual will not suffer
jail time or a criminal record and that any political push-back from com-
munities will be correspondingly lessened.234  Rounding out the dy-
namic, officers will be able to enforce the law free of fear that the
exclusionary rule will be applied, inasmuch as the issuance of a ticket or
summons is not typically deemed a Fourth Amendment seizure,235 and
the rule itself usually does not apply in the civil context.236
Ultimately, decriminalization, as Professor Alexandra Natapoff re-
cently noted, thus represents a compromise: “[U]nlike legalization, it ac-
cepts the criminal system as an appropriate governance mechanism for
an increasingly wide range of social behaviors and environments, even if
it rejects the overtly punitive, debilitating quality of incarceration.”237  In
light of the risks discussed above, it could be that nothing short of legali-
zation is required for a true wind down to take place.238  In Colorado and
Washington State, voters have decided to legalize personal possession of
marijuana, and policy makers nationwide are keeping a watchful eye on
the effects of the change.239  However, with other forms of public order
offenses now the subject of decriminalization efforts (such as jaywalk-
ing, public consumption of alcohol) legalization is unlikely, highlighting
the importance of the observations offered here.
233 See Marijuana Possession Arrest, Illegal Searches, and the Summons Court System:
Hearings of the New York City Council Public Safety Commission on Res. 986-A, at 10 (June
12, 2012) (Testimony of Professor Harry G. Levine), available at http://marijuana-arrests.com/
docs/Testimony-NYCityCouncil-Marijuana-Arrests—Illegal-Searches—Summons-Court-Sys-
tem-June-2012.pdf (noting risk that officers will continue or even increase enforcement under
a fee-based summons system).
234 I am indebted to Professor Josh Bowers for this insight.  To limit this threat, enforce-
ment authority of less serious offenses might be relegated away from police toward non-sworn
personnel. See Eric Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct Outside the “Le-
gitimate” Investigative Sphere, 94 CAL. L. REV. 617, 665 (2006).  While a constructive sug-
gestion, for reasons discussed earlier such a proposed shift would face powerful and very
likely successful institutional opposition from rank-and-file police and their departments.
235 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 5.1(i) (5th ed. 2013).
236 See The Exclusionary Rule, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 224, 240–41 (2014)
(citing Supreme Court decisions withholding application of the exclusionary rule in a variety
of civil cases).
237 Alexandra Natapoff, Decriminalizing Misdemeanors, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2494414.
238 In 2013, for the first time since the Gallup Organization began posing the question
over forty years ago, a majority of Americans (58%) supported marijuana legalization.  Art
Swift, For First Time, Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2013), http://
www.gallup.com.poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx.
239 See Amanda Paulson, Pot Learning Curve: Washington Cribs from Colorado’s Legal-
ization Roll-Out, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 8, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
2014/0708/Pot-learning-curve-Washington-cribs-from-Colorado-s-legalization-rollout-video.
